The U.S. SECRECY SYSTEM

As Much as Has Been Declassified on Chile, Much More Remains

By Peter Kornbluh

Compared to Chile, where the recorded secrets of the Pinochet era remain desaparecido like so many hundreds of victims, the United States has a relatively open system of access to classified government documents. There is a freedom of information law that can be used by "forensic historians"--investigators, scholars and students who want to exhume the long hidden documentation of U.S. national security agencies on, say, the U.S. role in Chile, or human rights abuses under the Pinochet regime. There is the discretion of the President to order agencies like the CIA and the Pentagon to release their secret records--without military intimidation and the fear of inciting a coup. And there is a public constituency for the "right to know" what the government has done in the good name of U.S. citizens, but without their knowledge.

But, as the release last week of documents on the death of three Americans in Chile shows, there remains a pathology of secrecy within the U.S. government that is difficult to overcome. The keepers of the secrets--in furtive agencies such as the CIA, the National Security Agency, and the U.S. military-- just don't want to let them go. No matter that the documents could shed light on the murders of two Americans, Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi, by Pinochet's men after the coup, or solve the disappearance in 1985 of Boris Weisfiler near Colonia Dignidad, helping to bring solace and closure to the families of all three men. Protecting "sources and methods," and covering up misconduct and malfeasance from years ago are far more important priorities.

When the Clinton White House ordered a special "Chile Declassification Project" in February 1999, the names of Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi--two Americans abducted, tortured and executed by the Chilean military in the days following the coup--were high on a list of prominent victims about whom the national security agencies were directed to review and release their files. Nevertheless, when the first release of documents took place one year ago, not a single page of CIA or Defense Department documents on either man was included. Those two agencies simply chose to ignore the President's directive. And despite protest from the Horman family, when the second installment of documents was released on October 8, 1999, only State Department records were declassified; intelligence and military documents remained hidden away in locked filing cabinets and secret vaults.

Considerable public and behind-the-scenes political and moral pressure forced these agencies to finally release documents on the Horman and Teruggi cases, as well as that of Boris Weisfiler last month. But, judging from the pathetic amount of documents actually declassified on June 30th, their effort to find and declassify records was less then complete. 

The CIA, whose under cover agents staffed many of the Embassy posts in 1973 that dealt with the Horman and Teruggi disappearances, has long been thought to have key files on their fate. Yet in the now famous case of Charles Horman, the CIA released all of 6 documents--almost all of them memoranda generated by the CIA's Congressional liaison and the CIA legal office in Washington. Most of those half dozen documents were heavily censored; blacked out were references to other documents that could have, and should have been declassified. Not a single cable or memo from the CIA station in Santiago was released; not a single intelligence report on any discussion with sources in the Chilean military about Horman and Teruggi; not a single inquiry from Headquarters to the Station about their murders; not a single file on Chilean agents such as Rafael Gonzalez with whom CIA agents had contact.

The Defense Department proved a bit more forthcoming than the CIA; but it remains unwilling to declassify the history still in its possession. Sources inside the Clinton Administration say that the Pentagon has documents on the Horman case that it located but still refuses to release. Since there has always been speculation that Horman's chance encounter with U.S. Naval personnel in Vina del Mar after the coup somehow contributed to his subsequent murder, the declassification of all Pentagon records are imperative to recording this history, pursuing the guilty, and bringing closure to this case.

To be sure, there were many important documents that were declassified. The FBI, after much procrastination, finally declassified a December 1972 report that showed that Frank Teruggi was under surveillance for purported radical affiliations. That document raises the question of whether U.S. intelligence on Teruggi was ever passed to Chilean authorities at the time of the coup.

And the State Department released substantive files of cables and reports on the 1985 disappearance of Boris Weisfiler near the suspicious German enclave known as Colonia Dignidad. Those files will hopefully contribute evidence and leads to the court case that the Weisfiler family has brought in Chile. They will also help Chileans to learn more about the controversial cult-like colony of German expatriates--one declassified cable described it as "a religious sect led by a charismatic leader similar to Jim Jones in the Jonestown (Guyana) disaster"--which lent avid support to the brutal rule of the Pinochet regime.

Overall, the Clinton administration's special declassification project on Chile, which is expected to generate over 22,000 previously secret documents by the final release in mid September, 2000, has been of great benefit to Chilean and American citizens alike. The declassified U.S. files can and will contribute to advancing the cause of human rights and justice in Chile. Chileans will have learned hidden details of the dark history of Pinochet's repression; and the declassification of the U.S. version of this history will hopefully serve as a model and impetus to pressure the Chilean military to divulge its own secret archives of atrocity and impunity, contributing to stronger democratic structures built around openness and accountability in governance. 

But for the U.S. declassification of documents on Pinochet to be true to democratic principles of the United States, those U.S. agencies that continue to cover up and obstruct the release of the full record on Chile will have to be held accountable--in the court of public opinion and perhaps the court of law as well. History can be hidden, at least temporarily, but it cannot be disappeared.

"To get to justice you have to get to truth," Charles Horman's widow, Joyce, said at a press conference last week. "And our road to truth has been excruciatingly long." We are getting closer to the end of the road, but we are not there yet. When the entire record is finally declassified, there will be truth and justice for the families of victims, accountability for governments, and finally a victory for the principle of the right-to-know--in both Chile and the United States.

*Peter Kornbluh is a specialist on U.S.-Chilean relations at the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research organization in Washington D.C. that has led the campaign for the declassification of U.S. records on Chile. His book, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier of Atrocity and Accountability will be published next year.

The Institute for Policy Studies is an independent center for research and education founded in 1963. IPS has worked to bring Pinochet to justice since the murders of two IPS colleagues, Orlando Letelier and Ronni Karpen Moffitt, at the hands of Pinochet's agents, in 1976.