| Von Glasersfeld's answers - February 2005  |

 
 
 


QUESTION 1:
 
Santiago de Cali; Feb 9th/2005

Doctor Glaserfeld, the principal point of this mail is, ¿how, from the treatment of the phyilosophical problem of the truth, make desappear the eskeptical´s problems, from the radical constructivism? If we, the constrictivistics researchers doesn´t resolve the eskepticals questions, the constructivistics thesis will be circulars.I, as philosophical and psychological researcher, pretend remove the esketicism canon of the principals philosóphical questions from an analysis of the various senses of the concept: external world. Definitely the eskepticals problem desappear as soon as desappear totally the metaphisical realism, and as soon as desappear, too, anyone tipe of realistic attide for make possible the knowledge. An argument for refute the realistic attitude is "the espontaneous construction of the object of the counciousnes", of this way the white snow of tarski´s semantic theory, doesn´t exist extern of mental operar. ¿What do you thing, in front to eskecticals problems and too the drifteds semantics problems?
 
Pst.: Dtr. Glazerfeld, please answer me: ¿Do you speak spanish?, thanks.
 
Best regards.
 
Att.:Carlos M.Muñoz S.
UNiversidad del Valle
Inscrito a: dpto de Filosofia
Instituto de Psicología
Grupo de investigación en filosofia de la mente y neurofilosofia: Mentis.

 

 
ANSWER 1:
Dear Mr. Suarez,

I am afraid I do not understand your question. You should get an English speaker to help you formulate them. If you want to get rid of scepticism, radical constructivism will not help you it goes further than scepticism: it does not doubt knowledge of reality, it considers it impossible.

I hope you try again.

Ernst von Glasersfeld
 

QUESTION 2:

Santiago de Cali; Feb 14/ 2005

Dr. Glazerfeld, tank you for your advice concerning to my "english".

For some time ago, I tried, and I try define completely the radical aspect of constructivism. In my investigation I've found that the eskepticals arguments reproduce the metaphisical realism. The problem is (in my investigation view) that the radical constructivism can't accept this realism because all, All the reality is a human construction, it cannot have a reality existing independently of the human mind operating.
If the Knowledge is considerate imposible for the constructivism, reproduce the metaphisical constructivism, and therefore the arguments on a reality existing logically independent of the human mind, I believe that the constructivism is totally radical when any realistic argument will be eliminated.
In this way, when denying the realism, denying the eskepticism. ¿What do you think on this point of view on radical constructivism?.

Thanks.
Best Reghards

Sorry, for my english.
 

ANSWER 2:

Dear Mr. Suarez,

As a constructivist I agree with the skeptics in saying that we cannot know any reality beyond our experience. I don't know what it would mean to say that such a reality "exists". The word has meaning only in the context of the framework of space and time that we construct. Constructivism is concerned with KNOWING not with BEING.

Best wishes,

Ernst von Glasersfeld
 

 

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